Imam al-Ghazali's Faysal al-Tafriqa Bayna al-Islam wa al-Zandaqa

Category: SOUND

The title is translated into English as: The Decisive Criterion for Distinguishing Islam from Masked Infidelity.

The English translation of the book is from On the Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam: Abu Hamid al Ghazali's Faysal al Tafriqa (Studies in Islamic Philosophy) by Dr. Sherman A Jackson (also known as Abdul Hakim Jackson).

Download Link: Click here for PDF

Description:

Abu Hamid al Ghazali, one of the most famous intellectuals in the history of Islam, developed a definition of Unbelief (kufr) to serve as the basis for determining who, in theological terms, should be considered a Muslim and who should not. Jackson's annotated translation is preceded by an introduction that reconstructs the historical and theoretical context of the Faysal and discusses its relevance for contemporary thought and practice.

It is composed of a somewhat lengthy introduction by Dr. Jackson followed by the translation. Here are some of my thoughts on Dr. Jackson's commentary, to be followed later by any notes on the work itself:

He says Al-Ghazali didn't go into his criticism of the Neoplatonists here. That's because he did that in Tahafut Al-Falasifah (Incoherence of the Philosophers).

He says the Qur'an is not a book of logic and doesn't tell us "how" to reason. Al-Ghazali derived the basic rules of syllogism from the Qur'an in Al-Qistas Al-Mustaqim (The Just Balance).

I would not trust anything written about the four Imams of fiqh from Western sources without verifying the claims yourself, including an Islamic scholar like Dr. Jackson because far too many works are either falsely attributed to or falsely disassociated from these 'ulema in the Western tradition and it is too easy to get caught up in these mistakes in Western academia.

The first 18-19 pages of the intro are good, then Dr. Jackson's own biases kind of bleed through. He is a Maliki in fiqh but he seems to be partial to Athari/Hanbali 'aqeedah, going so far as to reach over to Christian theology for some ideas which were totally unnecessary to bring into the book (though he does acknowledge they are antithetical to Islam) for the purposes of showing how anthropomorphism can be rational.

His discussion on tradition is insightful but unnecessary. Tradition can be reduced into terms of reason by thinking of it as the process of preserving a paradigm of thought (in a very Kuhnian manner), or preserving a living tradition of thought. This involves transmission and his definition of tradition, but not one without the other, as the goal is to preserve a living tradition (sort of like how we preserved the Sunnah, the living practice of the Qur'an). This is reflected in my book in the discussion of the madhahib and taqlid.

The criticism of the scholarly community in the section on Al-Ghazali's life is very well written and full of profound insight into today's affairs, which are a reverse of that era.

He quotes Imam al-Ghazali,

"How many towns are there that are devoid of Muslim doctors, while it is not permissible to accept the expert testimony of non-Muslims in cases involving the religious law. Yet, we do not see anyone devoting himself to the study of medicine. Instead, they fall over each other in pursuit of jurisprudence, especially dialectics and the art of disputation, despite the fact that there is an abundance of jurists who can issue legal opinions and address the issues of the day. I wish I knew how the jurists could sanction the undertaking of communal obligations that are already being met to the neglect of communal obligations that are not being met. Is there any reason for this other than the fact that the study of medicine does not provide easy access to executorships of religious endowments, bequests and estates of orphans or to judgeships, government positions, superiority over one's peers and power over one's enemies?"

While some might be eager to use these as arguments against scholarly tradition, they ought to be reminded that this particular academic tradition in Baghdad met an untimely end at the hands of the Mongols. God's wrath was already felt upon Baghdad and all those that Al-Ghazali had to deal with. The 'ulema of today are a great deal more influenced by Al-Ghazali than the pre-Al-Ghazali tradition. And conversely, Western orientalists had often lamented this, because they thought Al-Ghazali brought down the level of intellectual debate by discouraging debate (on the other hand, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy sees Al-Ghazali as ushering in a Golden Age of Islamic Philosophy by making logic part of the curriculum at madaris or seminaries). Yet they could only agree with the sentiment expressed above, and elsewhere in Al-Ghazali's works, that empirical work in the health and physical/natural sciences was a communal obligation no longer being fulfilled.

A fair bit of this is focused on a principle I have repeatedly brought up. The difference between a person's views and the logical consequences of those views. A person might have a set of beliefs which, taken to their logical extreme, necessitate a belief in flying dolphins... without actually believing in flying dolphins. So to attribute to such a person a belief in flying dolphins is incorrect, so care must be taken in drawing this line when criticizing the views of another. In terms of their beliefs in the moment, the theologians of the various sects, including some of the heretics, were mostly on the same page (i.e, their 'aqeedah). It is only in their statements of rationalization of their beliefs (more akin to theology) where differences arose because these different ways of stating the beliefs, when taken to their logical consequences/extremes, wound up in very different places, even kufr. Yet kufr was not an applicable label for the adherents because they were not guilty of believing in those resulting doctrines, they were just guilty of holding illogical or logically inconsistent views, so the issue here is the correction of logic or statement of belief moreso than a correction of belief, particularly on difficult subjects like the Divine Attributes which could be approached from any number of directions. This is something much more discernible in modern scholarship but not so much in Al-Ghazali's time.

The introduction closes on a very strong note by sticking to a discussion of Al-Ghazali's views, which is a worthwhile read for anyone.

The New Jabriyyah

Those whom I have taken to calling "neo-Jabriyyah" or "crypto-Jabriyyah":

Those who perpetrate questionable acts on the justification that Allah's Divine Decree (al-Qadr), or plan for creation, cannot be violated anyway. Implying but not stating outright (hence the prefix crypto-) that it thus absolves them of responsibility for their actions since the consequences are determined by Allah.

For example, chasing away potential converts on the pretext that if Allah chooses to guide them, then none can lead them astray.

This can be consistently or inconsistently applied. For another example which appears to contradict itself on the surface, aiming to achieve short term ends by using "the ends justify the means" logic while disregarding long term ends or vice-versa (focusing on long term ends at the expense of short term consequences). Either way, the set of ignored consequences, regardless of how arbitrarily they are chosen, are always ignored on the pretext of fatalism.

Neo-Jabriyyah would be those who openly harbor such beliefs but could also refer to those who hide them (crypto-Jabriyyah). One can observe a degree of this strain of thought running as an undercurrent in much extremist philosophy.

The original Jabriyyah were the school of Jahm ibn Safwan. They were influenced by pantheistic/atheistic/humanistic schools of Hindu philosophy (Sumaniya and Ajivikas). His followers eventually became deniers of the divine attributes and outright pantheists known as the Jahmiyyah. Jahm learned from his teacher, Ja'd ibn Durham, who invented the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur'an, which the Mu'tazilah later adopted. Some of them also adopted Neoplatonism in their pantheist theology.

Islamic Theology and Philosophy of Science

Category: STRONG

I've been working on this book about Islamic theology (orthodox specifically) during my free time the past two years and how it relates to philosophy of science, especially in recent times. It's a draft and a work in progress but I've run out of free time until probably 2013 or maybe even beyond so I'm putting up what I have so far. That's why it cuts off abruptly, I excised the unfinished parts.

It includes a little commentary on the previously mentioned Theologus Autodidactus and Philosophus Autodidactus.

Click here: http://islamtheologyscience.wordpress.com/

It includes a bit of discourse on theology, history of theology, and finally the more philosophical matters in theology and how it relates to science (including contrasting Islamic theology with Enlightenment era and later European/Western philosophy).

Please keep in mind this is a draft. I've said most of what I initially wanted to but it could use a good rewrite for readability in the future, especially some of the more complicated sections on science or philosophy where my strategy was to repeat the same thing in several ways hoping at least one way "clicks" for the reader. The final version, should I ever get time to complete it, could wind up very different but I feel there's some usefulness for Muslims with questions about these very matters. I won't put this in the "SOUND" section until I get a full overview by a scholar. I've had one read through most of the metaphysics bits and approve (I took very few liberties except in explaining the traditional, conservative, orthodox stance). The only issue of question is the stuff at the very end regarding discussion of the attributes of Allah, an extremely controversial subject, so I cut that out entirely until I finish it and a scholar looks at it first. I make a little mention of the subject in what is still left in and it might appear unorthodox because I use some arguments used by other theological sects at one time and now defunct, but they're essentially saying the same thing as the orthodox theologians. The wording might be easier for people to understand now in our times (whereas it was discounted for the opposite reason in its time). This is because the environment or situation that existed at that time doesn't exist today (competing theological sects within Islam... the orthodox Ash'ari/Maturidi have won out overwhelmingly and won't be challenged again). So, the issue isn't of meaning, since I intended to convey the orthodox position on all accounts, just of language.

Feel free to respond here in the comments section with questions or more preferably, e-mail islamtheologyscience@gmail.com and I'll try to answer questions as I get time.

The Theologus Autodidactus of Ibn al-Nafis

Category: SOUND

Otherwise known as al-Risala al-Kamiliyya fil-Sira al-Nabawiyya.

PDF Download Link

Backup Download Link

The English translation is literal in some parts, abbreviated in others. It was carried out by Meyerhof and Schacht. The Arabic is in the second half of the PDF.

Please download and reupload on other servers because I don't know how long that link will be valid.

Westerners call it one the earliest examples of a science-fiction novel or story.

It's a short story about a man who is spontaneously generated in a cave on a remote desert island and how he reasons out conclusions about the world around him. He's then picked up by another ship and taken to civilization where he continues his conclusions. He deduces most of the major points of 'aqeedah and Prophet Muhammad's (saw) history and mission (without the aid of Scripture), and then goes on to deduce future events that had not yet happened, including some of the major signs of the Day of Judgement (explaining them from a purely rational/scientific standpoint). He also covers some events of the time in which Ibn al-Nafis lived (the attack by the Mongols and the Mamelukes' defense).

So it starts off concerned with philosophy (including some "sci-fi" concerning the events which led to the protagonist's spontaneous generation), then after he's picked up by humans it turns towards theological issues. It ends with "science-fiction", an apocalyptic doomsday scenario (that concurs with Islamic theology/eschatology).

It's considered a Maturidi (well, Ash'ari but Ibn al-Nafis is working almost purely from the Maturidi view here) response to the earlier Philosophus Autodidactus (Hayy ibn Yaqdhan) by Ibn Tufail. That was a more popular work espousing some basic Mutazilah philosophy mixed with Ash'ari theology and Sufism (it was a "thought experiment" response to Al-Ghazali's Incoherence of the Philosophers). That work doesn't get into theology so much (because it was a popular opinion among those with Mutazilah reasoning that reason could not substantiate revelation), but it does cover some spiritual principles (strongly influenced by Sufism, so it's not like some sort of Mutazilah/Rationalist propaganda) as a sort of "replacement" for reason (but to those who don't believe in spirituality, mysticism is just another aspect of self-introspection and insight, and thus a part of the 'aql / Reason). Using his senses (hassi or hissi) and reason ('aql), the protagonist of Ibn Tufail's story discovers God, morality, and science. Regarding the latter, it mostly deals with the philosophy of empiricism (which is the basis for scientific inquiry and in which Ibn Sina, working from the philosophy of Aristotle, made a lot of developments... it's a philosophy that is most obviously shared by Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaat in case anyone's wondering).

What basically happened is that the Mutazilah emphasized reason and sensory experience (the individual) as a source of knowledge but also claimed that reason could not prove certain aspects of revelation. The debates between Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd were basically regarding the primacy of reason versus revelation. The intention behind this from the perspective of the orthodox theologians was that reason is subject to error so it cannot be held equivalent to or higher than revelation. So, naturally, Al-Ghazali had to take a very skeptical stance towards all aspects of rationalism. However, this exercise in and of itself showed that reason and rationalism could back up revelation but was subject to the errors of the mind wielding them. In other words, the Ash'ari and Maturidi schools (especially the Maturidi) uphold the power and scope of human reason ('aql) and sensory experience (hissi) but just do not use it as a source of knowledge equivalent to revelation (or even other true narratives). This is a significant epistemological difference because it's basically a different view of humanity and emphasizes the social nature of humans as opposed to the individual, as the Mutazilah philosophy did. In fact, the philosophy of the Ash'ari/Maturidi thinkers in the natural sciences was superior to the Mutazilah and it was a natural evolution of thought. Just as how primitive Greek thought gave way to the first generations of Muslim thinkers. Imam Ash'ari himself symbolized this transfer of power by the fact of his Mutazilah upbringing, then deciding it wasn't cutting it anymore.

Ibn Sina thought that reason could not prove the idea of bodily resurrection.This work, based on Ibn al-Nafis' own considerable experience as a physician and scientist, showed otherwise. He showed that reason and empirical scientific inquiry could back up revelation. He himself made significant contributions to human knowledge of anatomy and physiology, specifically pulmonary circulation (no doubt because many people feel that the "ruh" is related to the blood's circulation... without the circulation, death occurs). He also covers topics resembling modern notions of abiogenesis (the spontaneous generation of the protagonist in the cave from clay and water) and his defense of "bodily resurrection" with science, though obviously based on the limited knowledge of the 13th century, was eventually borne out by modern scientific theories (it's possible to clone or "regrow" a body or any of its constituent parts from a piece of the original).

The deviancies of the Mutazilah actually arose more out of a faulty reasoning. That was compounded by the role they assigned to reason ('aql) over revelation. The Ash'aris had to basically not only put reason in its proper place, secondary to revelation, but also refute the faulty reasoning of the Mutazilah (their philosophy was wrong even without any theological considerations). This work is a part of the latter effort.

Philosophus Autodidactus ("Self-taught Philosopher")

Theologus Autodidactus ("Self-taught Theologian")

The differences between the sects/schools is apparent in the two works because at the end of Hayy ibn Yadqhan, Hayy realizes society basically sucks and takes a friend from the outside world back to the island where they live out the rest of their days in mystic contemplation. It suggests religious pluralism, as Mutazilah philosophy usually did, because they were unable to make effective arguments for Islam over other religions. It's no coincidence that other philosophers of that tradition (such as Ibn Rushd) actually kickstarted the "secular" tradition in Europe. Their works found an audience in Europe where those thinkers were already grappling with the glaring flaws in Christian theology. This was aided by the fact that Al-Andalus (Spain) was a hotbed of Mutazilah activity.

Philosophus Autodidactus had a profound impact on Europe. You can read about some of that at the Wikipedia page and also here.

Very few Europeans received later developments in the Muslim world because many of the Ash'ari and Maturidi theologians weren't in Spain but back in the Middle East. However, later developments did eventually reach Europe as well (Al-Ghazali's skepticism and Ash'arite doctrine of occasionalism did show up in Europe... occasionalism died out but the skepticism found a strong foothold in the works of George Berkeley and David Hume).

Such is the intellect of Ibn al-Nafis that some of his reasoning would be new even to today's Muslim "Rationalists" (of course it was, he was one of the major scientists of his era whereas today's rationalists' works are often worth less than the paper they are printed on). There is nothing fundamentally wrong with trying to scientifically analyze claims of religion (as the Ash'aris and Maturidis did, evidenced by this work) but the problem arises when one does not realize that this is error-prone subjective speculation and then changes the primacy of revelation over reason. When people do that, problems arise. For example, people who decide that Adam (as) had to have been evolved from other "near-humans" (that he had a mother and father). This is incorrect because the Scripture clearly states otherwise. But abiogenesis ("the study of how biological life arises from inorganic matter through natural processes") in and of itself isn't theologically incorrect at all. As for whether Adam was subject to it, we cannot say because we do not know if the "natural laws" or Allah's Customary Way (jary al-ada) of this world apply to Paradise, where Adam (as) was created but the process described in the hadith sounds very much like it.